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The proliferation of state and local measures to address climate 
change has spawned a lively debate.  Much of this debate seeks to 
identify why sub-national levels of government would, seemingly 
illogically, grapple with an international challenge of global magnitude.1  
This is especially a puzzle since others’ inaction or opportunistic actions 
can defeat benefits of state and local activism.2  Some question the 
efficacy of such state and local efforts.3  A broad consensus notes, 
however, that in this and other areas of environmental regulation, state 
and local regulatory interventions have catalyzed support for federal 
legislation, with once vocal industry opponents coming to prefer federal 
legislation over often-diverse state and local measures.4  Scholars and 
 1. See, e.g., Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is 
Motivating States and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does 
This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1021-25 
(2006); Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate 
Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962-63 (2007); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities 
as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary Vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 681, 683-88 (2008). 
 2. See Engel, supra note 1, at 1023 (“[F]rom the perspective of benefiting from 
reductions in climate change, it makes little economic sense for a state or local 
government to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases.”); Stewart, supra note 1, at 
689-93. 
 3. See, e.g., Wiener, supra note 1, at 1962 (“[S]ubnational state-level action is not 
the best way to combat global climate change.”); but see David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. 
Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 
ARIZ. L. REV. 835, 837 (2008) (“[I]nducing technological change provides an 
independent ground for state action on climate change—one can think globally and still 
act locally.”). 
 4. See RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING 
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 209 (Yale Univ. Press 
1999); J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The 
Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1504-1508 (2007); E. Donald Elliott 
et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental 
Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326 (1985); Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, 
Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 
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policymakers broadly agree that larger-level responses are also necessary, 
ideally via international legal instruments and national legislation and 
implementing regulation.5 
This conference essay turns to a less addressed question that is 
becoming a central one in legislative venues.  If the United States enacts 
national climate change legislation, what role, if any, remains for state 
and local greenhouse gas (GHG) regulation?  This is, in part, a question 
for state and local governments that might be considering the utility of 
their own additional measures once federal law is enacted.  It is also, 
however, a question that federal legislators, regulators, and, ultimately, 
courts will need to resolve.  Should federal climate change legislation 
preempt state and local climate-related efforts?  If so, to what extent and 
through what sort of language and institutional structures?  Is a clean and 
predictable preemptive regime even possible?  If the presumption is to 
retain most or all of state and local governments’ plenary powers to 
address climate change and other sources of risk and concern, how 
should legitimate claims of conflict between federal and state or local 
law be resolved?  Finally, are there attributes of climate change policy 
that make it particularly suited to preemptive or non-preemptive federal 
legislation? 
This Article starts in Part I by reviewing the basic anticipated design 
elements of federal climate legislation, then it reviews the substantial 
regulatory failure risks inherent in such climate-change legislation.  It then 
turns in Part II to analysis of preemption choices.  The Article follows in 
Part III by examining preemption jurisprudence, especially the growing 
risk of broad preemptive reads of federal law, and demonstrating how 
statutory uncertainties regarding preemption could result in subsequent 
interpretations substantially expanding the law’s preemptive impact.  
The expanding and indeterminate body of “obstacle preemption” law 
poses especially significant risks for state and local climate change 
efforts.  After all, it is virtually unavoidable that residual state and local 
regulation will overlap with any federal climate law while also adopting 
somewhat different priorities and means to regulatory ends.  Obstacle 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 223-26 (2005) (labeling this phenomenon as a “domino effect” in 
which state regulation triggers industry to prefer federal regulation). 
 5. See, e.g., William L. Andreen, Federal Climate Change Legislation 
and Preemption, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 261, 266-69 (2008); Jonathan B. 
Wiener, Property and Prices to Protect the Planet, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 515, 
522-23 (stressing the importance of global participation). 
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preemption jurisprudence threatens to justify judicial preemptive 
conclusions if state or local laws merely strike a different balance than 
federal law.  Furthermore, as discussed in Part IV, overlap and interaction 
of concurrent federal, state, and local climate change laws creates an 
array of benefits.  This Article, therefore, concludes that federal climate 
legislation should adopt an anti-preemptive norm, with specific language 
preserving state and local legal turf. 
The Article closes in Part V by suggesting that still inevitable conflicts 
will arise, but that such preemption disputes over climate-related 
regulation, whether raised by governments or private actors, should be 
analyzed in accordance with strongly anti-preemption statutory criteria.  
Even better would be direction of preemption claims not straight to the 
courts but to a newly created Preemption Review Committee.  The 
Preemption Review Committee, like the Endangered Species Review 
Committee that can authorize otherwise illegal harms to endangered 
species in extraordinary circumstances, would be constituted of high 
level federal officials from several agencies and departments as well as 
state representatives. This new committee would take evidence on 
claims of unduly burdensome legal conflicts and issue a record-based 
ruling.  Only then would judicial review enter the picture.  This procedural 
hurdle and requirement of record evidence of undue conflicts would 
preclude litigants and courts from making conclusory arguments about 
conflicts.  Such a committee-structured regulatory crucible would serve 
to check preemption arguments and try to ensure that preemption 
decisions are based on both statutory criteria and on actual evidence 
about the effects of overlapping state, local, and federal law. 
I.  CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION AND THE INEVITABILITY                          
OF PARTIAL REGULATORY FAILURE 
Pending federal climate legislation has a number of basic elements.  
Despite some ongoing debate over whether a carbon tax or a federal 
“cap-and-trade” scheme would be more effective to address climate 
change, current momentum favors a cap-and-trade scheme.6  This Part 
 6. See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address 
Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 348-53 (2008) (comparing and preferring a 
cap-and-trade scheme to a carbon tax approach); Jonathan B. Wiener, Radiative Forcing: 
Climate Policy to Break the Logjam in Environmental Law, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 210, 
238-42 (2008) (advocating a cap-and-trade scheme for GHG emissions). For more works 
discussing the mechanics of a cap-and-trade system, see Lesley K. McAllister, The 
Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 398-410 (2009) 
and Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach to Global 
Climate Policy: Issues of Design and Practicality, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 83, 103-
106 (1992) (discussing cap-and-trade in the international context). 
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discusses the basic anticipated architecture of federal climate legislation 
and ways it is likely to result in at least partial regulatory failure. 
At its most basic, federal law would set a national GHG-cap measured 
by annual aggregate emissions of carbon dioxide equivalents of various 
GHGs, with that cap dropping over time.  Via some sort of distribution 
of carbon dioxide (CO2) allowances to polluters, all emitters of GHGs 
would have to emit no more than their purchased or received allowances.  
Some of these allowances would likely also be generated by “offsets,” 
usually natural states, technologies, or actions that actually serve to 
reduce anticipated atmospheric GHG levels, thereby generating offset-
based credits, which in turn would function like allowances.  To 
minimize costs associated with reductions in GHG emissions, entities 
holding or needing allowances would participate in a GHG market, 
trading CO2 allowances and offset credits.  This would allow a market to 
function, with low-cost measures to reduce GHGs or produce offsets 
rewarding best performers by reducing their need to purchase 
allowances and allowing them to profit by selling allowances to emitters 
less able to reduce their emissions.  A cap-and-trade market would thus 
reward lowest-cost-emissions reducers and also allow emitters lacking 
easy ways to reduce pollution to buy or hold onto allowances for their 
own use.  Liberal provisions allowing banking of allowances and credits 
would also provide emitters flexibility and reward innovators able to 
reduce emissions.  Since a GHG emitted anywhere has the same effect 
everywhere (if taken by itself, with no associated more local effects),7 
trading should greatly reduce costs associated with legally mandated 
GHG reductions. 
Federal legislation is also likely to contain other measures mandating 
or incentivizing efficiency improvements for consumer products and 
cars.  Federal law will likely also help with adaptations for climate-
change harms and disruptions likely to result from a law mandating 
GHG reductions.  Federal law might also set performance standards for 
certain categories of large emitters, in effect requiring them to do their 
best to reduce GHG emissions, totally separate from cap-and-trade 
dynamics. 
 7. This will seldom be the case, since GHGs are often separately regulated for 
other effects, often are accompanied by co-pollutants, and have other harms and 
distributional effects associated with their production.  These realities are discussed infra 
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This sounds clean, efficient, and likely to benefit from the miracle-of-
market economics.  In reality, however, climate change legislation is 
unusually vulnerable to a large number of regulatory failure risks. 
A. A Cap That is Too High 
Federal law that sets the cap too high is perhaps the greatest failure 
risk.  Despite abundant science establishing the substantial role of 
anthropogenic contributions to climate change and a growing consensus 
about atmospheric levels needed to avoid potentially catastrophic 
effects,8 congressional politics are never solely science-based.  Due to 
huge industrial and regional tradeoffs, as well as costs and possible 
benefits associated with climate change and any climate-change law, 
legislative horse-trading to gain necessary votes is inevitable.9  A likely 
result of hardball legislative politics is a federal law that sets the target 
cap too high or ratchets down its caps at too slow a rate to effect needed 
atmospheric reductions.  This is especially risky during a time of 
economic recession, as is the case during mid-2009, while this Article is 
being drafted.  A federal law that imposes economic hardship on an 
already-struggling United States economy would be politically difficult 
for legislators to support.  A highly likely result is a weakened federal 
law that reduces costs and burdens by raising its cap to gain political 
viability. Critics of the bill that emerged from the House of 
Representatives at the end of June 2009 criticized it on just these 
grounds, claiming the cap is both too high and too slow to require actual, 
substantial reductions.10 
Other developments confirm the risk that any ultimately enacted law 
will be unduly lax and not prompt needed swift innovations and 
pollution reductions.  The shift during the spring of 2009 to a federal bill 
that would not distribute allowances by auction, as preferred by most 
policy analysts, to a law that freely hands out allowances to powerful 
 8. See generally M.L. PARRY ET AL., IPPC 2007: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, 
IN CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTION AND VULNERABILITY 7, 11-18 (2007), 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf. 
 9. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 4, at 1539-45 (analyzing the interaction of 
various interest groups and the potential legislative result); Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540-44 (1983) (discussing how “[a]lmost all 
statutes are compromises”); Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional 
Federalism: Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1199, 1238-40 (discussing legislative compromise). 
 10. John M. Broder, House Passes Bill to Address Threat of Climate Change, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26, 2009, at A1 (reporting passage of bill by House but also opposition of 
some environmental groups on grounds that bill is too lax). 
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interests11 is evidence of the importance of political compromise and 
appeasement of legislative and industry opponents.12  This shift may 
have been necessary to assemble an adequate supportive legislative 
coalition, but auctioning such allowances would be a more effective 
means to accomplish both environmental and market goals.  Auctioning 
all or most allowances would create immediate incentives for everyone 
to ratchet back their pollution because every unit of emissions would 
require purchase of an allowance or possibly an offset credit.13  In 
addition, incentives for innovations, conserving energy, and reducing 
pollution would be enhanced with more entities bidding for allowances, 
if new market entrants were not monetarily disadvantaged compared to 
grandfathered pollution sources receiving free allowances, and if old 
polluters were not rewarded with allowances.14  In addition, money 
generated could be used to finance other government projects.  With free 
allocations, in contrast, wealth associated with allowances flows into 
private hands, and the incentive to reduce emissions is reduced 
immediately because allowances are allocated free-of-charge.15  This 
would likely reduce their market price and certainly reduce pressure on 
 11. See, e.g., Key Provisions of the Climate Bill, WASHINGTON POST, June 27, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/26/AR2009062602746.html 
 12. However, as Lesley McAllister observes, despite policy analysts’ preferences 
for distribution via auction, preceding analogous cap-and-trade regimes have 
also ultimately allocated pollution allowances for free, mostly to existing polluters.  
McAllister, supra note 6, at 411. 
 13. As Professor Merrill observes, whether pollution is subject to a tax or a 
purchase obligation, the effect is akin to a Pigouvian tax.  By associating pollution with a 
monetary charge, all polluters will face at least modest incentives to reduce emissions.  
See Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 276 
(2000).  For more detailed discussion of incentives and the choice of free distribution of 
pollution allowances versus auctioning such rights, see discussion infra notes 14-17 and 
accompanying text. 
 14. See generally Chulho Jung et al., Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement 
Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives, 30 J. ENVTL. 
ECON. & MGMT. 95 (1996) (ranking regulatory instruments and incentives created for 
innovation, and finding freely distributed permits inferior to auctioned permits and other 
incentive-based instruments); Scott R. Milliman & Raymond Prince, Firm Incentives to 
Promote Technological Change in Pollution Control, 17 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 247 
(1989) (assessing pollution-reducing instruments, and finding auctioned permits to 
provide the best incentives for innovation); Thomas H. Tietenberg, Tradable Permits in 
Principal and Practice, 14 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 251, 271 (2006) (discussing innovation 
incentives undercut if new market entrants face higher costs than grandfathered polluters 
or others given free pollution rights). 




BUZBEE 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2016  10:56 AM 
 
polluters receiving free allowances to innovate and reduce emissions.16  
Yet, if the focus is on the cap, if free allowance allocation is the political 
price to have the law enacted, and if trading will follow the free 
allocations, then the environmental results over the long term should not 
dramatically differ.17  Nevertheless, a shift to free allocations does 
reduce short-term incentives for pollution reduction and also weakens 
innovation incentives.  It is a near certainty that more similar 
compromises will weaken the law’s environmental benefits. 
Furthermore, despite the strong scientific consensus about the roots of 
climate change and its potential dramatic effects, climate change’s 
causes, effects, and regulatory responses all confront a handful of 
cognitive and political economic shortcomings that are likely to create 
either pressures for a lax cap or delayed reductions in that cap.18  For 
citizens to demand climate change legislation and legislators to supply it 
will require both to give great weight to a largely invisible threat of 
uncertain effect that will become most evident at least decades in the 
future.  A common cognitive shortcoming identified in behavioral law 
and economics scholarship is poor human ability to sort out different 
magnitudes of risk, especially those that are unfamiliar and will arise in 
the future.19 
Furthermore, climate change is likely to require virtually everyone in 
some ways to change how they usually behave.  Change tends to be 
opposed due to the “status quo” bias under which people value what they 
have more than they would pay to obtain the same status in the first 
place.20 
For legislators, the status quo bias is compounded by political 
economic dynamics.  Businesses, regulators, and interest groups invest 
 16. See McAllister, supra note 6, at 422 (noting the relationship between market 
price and the incentive to innovate). 
 17. See Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal 
Climate Change Legislative Proposal Is “Best”?, 102 NW. L. REV. 123, 139 (2007) 
(“Whether allocations are auctioned or given away will have little effect on the ultimate 
economic efficiency of the policy, since trade will efficiently allocate the allotments.”). 
 18. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate 
Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 
(2009); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 299, 304-11 (2000). 
 19. See Joni Hersh & W. Kip Viscusi, Allocating Responsibility for the Failure of 
Global Warming Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV 1657, 1684- 92 (2007) (discussing the 
problems of uncertainty and discounting). 
 20. For works discussing the status quo basis, see William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the 
Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 33-36 (2003); 
Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case 
for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1224- 26 (2003); and William 
Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 7, 7 (1988). 
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in any particular regulatory arrangement and will frequently see any 
change as undercutting past investments and requiring new investments.21 A 
climate law would lead to pervasive changes and hence would be met 
with resistance. 
Major storm events like Hurricane Katrina may create a pro-climate-
change legislation availability heuristic, under which people weigh 
recent and significant experiences more heavily than other concerns.22  
The availability heuristic could also, however, lead citizens, stakeholders, and 
legislators to focus on more immediate and pressing challenges like the 
recession, medical costs, or wars abroad.  Furthermore, legislators are 
sure to hear from industry stakeholders due to lobbyists and substantial 
monetary stakes in any climate legislation; legislators may come to 
weigh those oft-heard views more heavily than the interests of citizens 
or the environment that may have few, if any, spokespeople.  When one 
adds in the influence of funded lobbyists and political contributions, the 
influence of dollars will cut against a rigorous climate-change law. 
In combination, these cognitive tendencies and often-linked political 
economic dynamics explain the low priority given by most citizens to 
climate change.23  It similarly is consistent with the seeming indifference 
 21. An unsettling change in the law will predictably require new investments by 
those affected to adjust as necessary.  Those responsive investments can possibly lead to 
resistance to subsequent change, even efforts to return to the original status quo.  See 
generally William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 
149 U. PENN. L. REV. 171, 206-210 (2000) (in criticizing judicial tendency to engage in 
“one-Congress fiction” in drawing interpretive inferences from language usage in 
different statutes, discussing political economic dynamics surrounding unsettling judicial 
interpretations of disputed language); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and 
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of 
Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV.  431, 435-40  (1989) (exploring how original enacting political 
coalitions are unlikely to join together again to correct an unexpected change in the law 
due to how those changes will also change the law’s distributional impacts and resulting 
incentives). 
 22. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1127-28 (1974); see also Cass R. Sunstien, On the Divergent 
American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 534-40 
(2007) (discussing the availability heuristic in the context of terrorism and climate 
change). 
 23. A 2009 poll and study revealed that despite an avalanche of news items about 
climate change science, passage of a climate bill by the House of Representatives and 
debate over such a bill in the Senate, most citizens had little or no understanding of the 
goals or content of a “cap-and-trade” bill.  See Christa Marshall, Most Americans still 
foggy on cap and trade, CLIMATEWIRE, Oct. 16, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2009/ 
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of many legislators.  Correspondingly, the lack of any single institution 
or actor with chief responsibility for climate ills or legislation, and the 
likely dispersion of regulatory roles among numerous committees and 
regulators, means that both enactment of climate legislation and 
subsequent implementation drift are a risk due to “regulatory commons” 
dynamics.24  Under such dynamics, a risk or social ill that is effectively a 
regulatory opportunity shared in common with many, and that creates a 
setting where blame and credit flow in uncertain ways, can lead both 
those potentially demanding and supplying regulation to ignore a social 
ill, leaving it a regulatory gap.  This has long been the status of climate 
change.  Climate-change legislation still has a chance of enactment 
during 2009 or 2010, but the same political economic and regulatory 
commons dynamics that have long frustrated climate change political 
efforts remain barriers and, even if a law is enacted, threaten to derail 
subsequent implementation. 
B. The Cap Proves Too High or Slow 
Even if Congress and the President miraculously get the cap right at 
the moment federal legislation is enacted, there is no guarantee it will 
remain appropriate.  Scientific data on climate change causes and effects 
continue to develop rapidly.  Many supposedly worst-case scenarios 
discussed in the most recent International Panel on Climate Change 
report have proven to be unduly optimistic.25  In addition, economic and 
political dynamics remain unpredictable, as does the development of 
new industries and products.  The net implication of this area of rapid 
change and uncertainty is that subsequent scientific, political, and 
economic development is highly likely to reveal that the cap is too high 
or too slow in planned reductions.  But once a federal law is enacted, 
strong resistance to any amendment is a certainty.  An ineffective law 
that is locked in place would be a major regulatory failure. 
C. Changing Science and Predictions About                                           
Climate and Markets 
Predicting and modeling climate change’s causes, effects, and future 
implications is a massive, complex undertaking at the bounds of human 
and computer capacity.  For example, until the last few years, few people 
 24. See Buzbee, supra note 20; Engel & Saleska, supra note 4, at 190-91. 
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focused on the massive contribution of cattle and cow emissions26 or on 
black carbon emitted from widespread use of inefficient stoves and other 
dirty forms of combustion.27  Even the best-intentioned federal law could 
prove to be aimed wrong, either missing major causes or risks or possibly 
over-regulating risks that prove minor. 
In addition, the effectiveness of a cap-and-trade strategy is based on 
complex assumptions about market behavior and production methods.  A 
huge question is whether a cap will create enough scarcity to reward 
entities reducing emissions or creating offsets.  A cap that is too high 
would undercut a new carbon market.  In addition, a new cap-and-trade 
scheme can be destroyed if claims about baseline emissions or future 
emissions are inaccurate, if policing of market trades and actual 
emissions proves inadequate, or if cheating pervades the market.  
Markets need scarcity, reliable monitoring, and enforcement.  Where a 
regulatory regime is creating and relying on a new massive market, 
regulatory failure will flow ineluctably from market failures.  Cruder, 
more tested forms of regulation, such as technology-based performance 
standards, or perhaps a carbon tax, might be necessary if cap-and-trade 
proves a disappointment. 
D. Cap-Lowering Delays 
The timing of cap reductions is critical both to achieving reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions and in creating market scarcity that will 
reward pollution reductions and prompt innovations.28  Even if the 
ultimate endpoint cap is sound, the interim steps to get there can be too 
slow and lax, thereby also undercutting the market.  Although society 
has an interest in rapid reductions in GHGs, those most directly affected 
will surely lobby to put off the day when production and behavioral 
changes, and attendant expenses, will have to be confronted.  And if 
interim caps are too lax, especially in combination with initial distribution 
of free carbon allowances, incentives for innovation will be minimal and 
incentives for innovations undercut. 
 26. See, e.g., Allison N. Hatchett, Note, Bovines and Global Warming: How the 
Cows are Heating Things Up and What Can Be Done to Cool Them Down, 29 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 767 (2005). 
 27. See, e.g., V. Ramanathan & G. Carmichael, Global and Regional Climate Changes 
Due to Black Carbon, 1 NATURE GEOSCI. 205, 226 (2008). 
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E. Innovation Errors 
Opponents of climate legislation mainly focus upon economic 
hardship and putting the United States at a disadvantage in a highly 
competitive world.29  They predict high costs of adjustment, dislocation 
of industry and workers, and market and technological innovations that 
will trail legislative mandates.  This could, of course, be true.  However, 
if precedent is our guide, major industries over recent decades have 
repeatedly claimed that regulations mandating reductions in pollution 
and risks would have massive resulting costs.  Actual studies after the 
fact, however, have repeatedly shown that those predictions were far 
higher than reality.30 Part of those disparities likely results from strategic 
exaggerations of anticipated costs in an effort to either shift regulatory 
burdens elsewhere or defeat regulation outright. 
New regulatory burdens also may cost less than predicted due to the 
manner in which new regulatory schemes themselves prompt and reward 
innovation.  Any new regulatory regime creates market opportunities.  
Both those burdened by new regulation and those who can profit from 
sale of cost-saving innovations have incentives to produce or find low-
cost innovations to reduce the targeted risk.  Incentives for low cost 
innovations are especially strong under a market-based environmental 
law regime that rewards any risk reduction by allowing a polluter to sell 
unused pollution rights or reduce the need to acquire them.  Predictions 
about climate change legislation’s effects could similarly err in 
predicting possible rates of progress and costs of meeting regulatory 
mandates.  Especially with market dynamics under a cap-and-trade 
scheme, large and small cost-saving innovations could substantially 
differ from anticipated outcomes.  However, due to possibly inordinate 
fear of compliance costs, the level of capped GHG reductions might be 
too high and rate of decline too slow, not adequately anticipating and 
reflecting the benefits of responsive innovations. 
II.  THE PREEMPTION CHOICE MENU 
Climate change legislation is critical, but it faces numerous regulatory 
failure risks. From the viewpoint of many prominent industry 
stakeholders and their allies, a major impetus for federal law is a 
 29. See, e.g., Christa Marshall, Can Farm Groups Kill the Climate Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 
30, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/06/30/30climatewire-can-farm- 
groups-kill-the-climate-bill-71264.html?scp=2&sq=climate%20legislation%20opposition&st 
=cse. 
 30. See, e.g., Winston Harrington et al., On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost 
Estimates 19 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297, 300 (2000). 
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different sort of regulatory risk.  Polluters tend to dislike the existence of 
overlapping regulatory regimes due to resulting legal complexities, 
additional legal obligations, and the possibility that obligations imposed 
by state or local law will be more stringent than federal law.31  Polluters, 
therefore, see federal law as a means to undercut or preempt outright 
state and local law as well as common law litigation directed at climate 
change and its many contributing sources.32  As Professor Andrews and 
others have long noted, proliferating state and local laws can turn 
industry opponents of regulation into advocates for a single federal 
law.33  But a new federal law could, in fact, utilize several different types 
of preemption, partial preemption, or non-preemptive choices.34  The 
leading federal climate bill appears likely to utilize a partially preemptive 
strategy.  This Part explains the preemption choices in very basic terms 
and then sketches briefly the likely partially preemptive strategy in 
federal climate legislation. 
A. Preemption Strategy Choices 
A totally preemptive federal regime is possible but has been a rarity in 
addressing pollution, environmental harms, and other risks.  A totally 
preemptive federal law would make federal law the sole regulator of a 
field of concern.  Contributors to such a risk would look exclusively to 
federal law to ascertain their obligations.  Complete preemption is an 
industry dream, especially if the preemptive law is also lax, but in reality 
it is extraordinarily rare.  First, as discussed below, the broader the 
regulatory goal, the harder it is even to devise a preemptive regime due 
to unavoidable areas of regulatory overlap.  With a ubiquitous source of 
risk such as GHGs, almost any activity relates to climate change.  
Displacing hundreds of areas of state and local regulation due to one risk 
associated with that activity is unworkable.  Second, where a genuine, 
thorny social ill is the challenge, legislators will often want federal, state, 
 31. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The 
Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003) 
(discussing problems of regulatory accretion). 
 32. For discussion of industry’s efforts to use preemption to gain regulatory relief, 
see THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR (Yale Univ. Press 2008). 
 33. See ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 209; Elliott et al., supra note 4, at 326. 
 34. For a summary of preemption doctrine, see Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme 
Court Preemption Doctrine, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF 
FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 119 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009). 
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and local actors to work together to address the ill.35  If the preemption 
question concerns the ongoing viability of common law regimes, federal 
legislation seldom will assert broad preemptive impact due to both the 
lack of compensatory remedies in most areas of risk and environmental 
regulation and the benefits of common law regimes in ferreting out 
neglected areas of undue risk.36 
Complete or near complete preemption is thus rare.  It is at its most 
justifiable where a particular product design is at issue and that product 
both benefits from production economies of scale and is widely 
distributed.  Thus, for example, the Clean Air Act generally embraces a 
non-preemptive strategy, but car emissions are subject to a single federal 
standard unless California is granted a waiver to require its own less-
polluting cars.37  At that point, other states can choose between the 
federal and California car.  Similarly, federal appliances are subject to a 
federal efficiency regime, with California able to petition to require even 
more efficient appliances.38 
A completely preemptive federal law would create a unitary federal 
standard, in effect setting a regulatory floor and ceiling.39  A regulatory 
ceiling would prohibit even similarly directed state or local laws from 
doing more to address a risk or harm.  Despite the rarity of such 
complete preemption in the law, federal agencies and some industry 
advocated for it with success from around 2005 to 2008, late in the 
administration of George W. Bush.40  That broad preemption is a rarity 
outside quite specific regulation of product features is unsurprising.  
 35. See Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, 
supra note 34, at 33, 42-44 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (discussing the benefits of 
state and federal regulatory overlap); Stewart, supra note 1, at 699-704 (weighing the 
cost and benefits of continued state regulation in the presence of federal regulation). 
 36. See David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Risks, in PREEMPTION 
CHOICE, supra note 34, at 54, 56-58 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (arguing that “tort 
law is an important backstop to regulation”); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 
1202-04 (2009) (contrasting FDA’s new 2006 pro-preemption views with the FDA’s 
longstanding opposite view that FDA regulation and common law regimes 
served complementary functions, furthered statutory goals given an often underfunded and 
understaffed FDA, and created appropriate incentives for manufacturers). 
 37. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1), (e)(2)(A) (2000); See also Anne E. Carlson, 
Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281 
(2003) (discussing these provisions) [hereinafter Greenhouse Gas Emissions]. 
 38. See generally Ann E. Carlson, Energy Efficiency and Federalism,  1 SAN DIEGO J. 
CLIMATE & ENERGY L.  11  (2009). 
 39. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the 
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1567-76 (2007); see also Robert L. 
Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption 
by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. 
L. REV. 579, 602-610 (2008) (analyzing the limited justifications for ceiling preemption). 
 40. See MCGARITY, supra note 32; Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: 
Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007). 
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After all, when regulation concerns behavior, production processes, and 
harms associated with behavior or production, uniform regulatory 
burdens will be rare; production variations and context-based distinctions, 
often worked out through permitting procedures, will lead to diverse, 
tailored legal obligations.  In such settings, a uniform law is unnecessary. 
The far more prevalent federal preemption choice is to enact a law that 
is only partially preemptive, typically with provisions that explicitly 
preserve or “save” state and local law.  Such prevalent laws often 
contain other provisions that seek to enlist state and local involvement 
through cooperative federalism structures.  This norm utilizes federal 
law as a floor.41  Federal law sets a certain minimum allowable level of 
risk and prohibits any jurisdiction from dropping its standards to be 
more lax.  This is the explicit legislative choice in most environmental 
laws.  Similarly, food and drug regulation, while not always explicitly 
preserving state and local regulatory turf, has been long- construed by 
most federal regulators and courts to assume the ongoing existence of 
common law regimes and non-conflicting state and local regulatory 
protections. 
Federal law that purports to be completely non-preemptive is possible, 
but due to the workings of the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, it is 
difficult to envision a law that does not at least potentially act to preempt 
conflicts or create a federal regulatory floor.  Still, a federal law that 
regulates a source of risk could rationally declare itself completely non-
preemptive and allow a proliferation of state and local laws directed at 
similar ends.  But if, in application, a federal and a state or local law 
were to come into direct conflict by, for example, mandating two 
mutually inconsistent designs, then federal law would preempt the 
clashing law.42 
B.  The Likely Federal Climate Change Legislation                          
Preemption Choices 
Preemption choices, like most regulatory choices, are heavily 
influenced by the particular attributes of the regulatory challenge.  Such 
attributes include the underlying physical, scientific, and economic 
realities, preceding related regulatory regimes, the stakeholders, 
and risks and rewards for both those demanding regulation and those 
 41. See Buzbee, supra note 39, at 1564-68. 
 42. See Schroeder, supra note 34, at 131-35 (discussing conflict preemption). 
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who can supply it.  In addition, the regulatory strategies and tools used 
to address an ill—such as performance-based standards, design 
mandates, information revelation, or utilization of market-creating or 
mimicking strategies—will shape the viability and efficacy of the chosen 
legislative architecture and related preemption choices.  As discussed in 
succeeding Parts, a portion of the answer to the preemption choice 
question is driven by the ubiquitous nature of activities contributing to 
rising GHG levels and the unavoidably huge number of regulatory fields 
relating to GHG emissions. 
Federal climate legislation is virtually certain to contain efficiency 
standards for cars, appliances, and perhaps even homes and buildings.  
Such standards, to have any effect, need to set a regulatory floor at a 
minimum.  A federal efficiency floor would be much like those in place 
for cars and appliances.  The question is whether to allow more stringent 
state and local regulation.  Even that choice, however, actually splits into 
three dominant likely choices: an exclusive federal standard that 
becomes the unitary standard, operating as a ceiling and a floor; a 
presumptive exclusive unitary federal standard subject to a limited opt 
out or waiver for California, perhaps with other states able to piggyback 
on California’s different and more stringent choice; or, lastly, a federal 
standard that operates as a floor but gives state and local governments 
discretion to enact more stringent standards without any preceding 
approval.43  Any of these options could be implemented just by federal 
actors or potentially through cooperative federalism structures, especially 
delegated federal programs that hand implementation and enforcement 
authority over to states.44 
It is hard, however, to implement a workable delegated program 
federalism structure with anything more preemptive than a federal law 
setting a regulatory floor.  When a state assumes delegated program 
duties, states will necessarily tailor their implementation of federal law 
to their own laws, contexts, and political priorities.  A fully preemptive 
federal floor and ceiling would be unlikely to offer states the latitude 
they need and would likely engender preemption litigation by targets of 
state regulation.  Perhaps for this reason, all federal environmental laws 
with delegated program provisions are accompanied by savings clauses 
 43. Of course, a limited opt out for a particular state need not choose California, 
but the tradition of special treatment for California and its history of innovation and 
leadership make it the most likely choice for any such partial opt out from an otherwise 
federalized regulatory regime.  See generally Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1097 (2009). 
 44. See Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate Change 
Legislation: The Value of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 791, 
814-23 (2008) (discussing cooperative federalism models). 
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making clear that states can make their own laws more stringent than 
federal law.45 
The most important and distinctive principal element of a federal 
climate bill would create a federal cap-and-trade regime.  As summarized 
earlier and discussed in accompanying conference papers, especially that 
of Professor Kaswan, the federal government would set a series of 
declining GHG caps.46  The cap would be enforced by only allowing 
GHG emissions pursuant to a federal allowance acquired from the 
government either via an outright grant, via purchase at an auction held 
by the federal or perhaps state governments, or via acquisition from 
other allowance holders who find it more profitable to sell than use 
them.  Allowances (or credits usable in ways akin to allowances) could 
also be created by offset activities. 
A cap-and-trade regime could itself utilize diverse preemptive and 
non-preemptive options.  Key questions are whether there should exist 
only a single federal GHG trading market or whether states or regions 
should retain the ability to continue with their own slightly older, but still 
young, cap-and-trade regimes.47  It appears that there is broad agreement 
that an initial shift to a single national market, which eventually would 
tie into an international market, is preferable to having parallel, but 
possibly slightly different, GHG trading regimes.48  However, the 
agreement that a single federal, national GHG trading regime constitutes 
the best scheme is separate from the question of whether state or local 
governments should retain the power now or in the future to restart (or 
start anew) a state or local GHG trading market. 
For a cap-and-trade market to work, it is critical that the sellable 
commodity—the CO2 allowance—be a uniform currency.49 The same 
 45. Even those few more fully preemptive provisions—for example, car emission 
and appliance efficiency standards—provide a safety valve allowing petitions for more 
stringent regulation by California and piggybacking states.  See Carlson, supra note 37; 
Glicksman & Levy, supra note 39, at 640-42. 
 46. See generally Alice Kaswan, Decentralizing Cap-and-Trade? The Question of 
State Stringency, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 103  (2009) . 
 47. See Andreen, supra note 5 at 275-82 (discussing state and local climate change 
initiatives, including in-state and regional cap-and-trade regimes). 
 48. See Stavins, supra note 6, at 324-27 (discussing the relationship between a 
federal cap-and-trade scheme and existing state and international programs). 
 49. See Jillian Button, Note, Carbon: Commodity or Currency? The Case for an 
International Carbon Market Based on the Currency Model, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
571 (2008); see also James Salzman & J. B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification 
of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000). 
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holds true of offsets that would generate allowances.  Thus, the criteria 
for CO2 allowances and offsets likely need to be nationally uniform if 
the national market is to work.  To create a uniform currency requires 
that the relative climate change effects of different gasses compared to 
CO2 be agreed upon, ensuring that allowances, wherever generated, have 
the same value.  In effect, an allowance needs to be like a dollar or some 
other monetary metric with an understood value.  Much as Afghanistan 
needed a uniform currency rather than diverse tribal currencies,50 the 
United States needed a single federal currency rather than distinctive 
state currencies,51 and even the European Union needed to shift to a 
single currency to start functioning as a union,52 a liquid and efficient 
GHG allowance market requires a consistent currency. In order for free 
trade across state and, possibly, international lines to succeed, allowances 
need to have an understood unit of value so that polluters can assess 
their emissions and allowance needs or surplus. 
The leading federal climate bills resolve these questions by mandating 
a single, federal cap-and-trade market that preempts all other such 
markets for six years.  Existing markets are given means to shift to the 
federal scheme, but for six years, the cap and related trading would be 
under an exclusively federal market.  The leading bills’ provisions 
regarding state power are quite clear that this time-limited preemption is 
only of state regulatory strategies utilizing cap-and-trade elements; state 
authority to regulate GHG emitters through other strategies is preserved.  
The next part turns to strategies to ensure that additional state regulation 
is effective to reduce emissions. 
C. The Thorny Excess Allowance Issue 
A climate law should generally preserve broad state and local climate 
authority outside of (a) a preemptive federal cap-and-trade market, 
including a consistent national allowance currency and (b) preemptive 
federal floors regarding various sorts of efficiency standards, ensuring 
that no jurisdictions adopt more lax standards.53  The law might also (c) 
 50. John F. Burns, Threats and Responses: Kabul; For Afghan Central Bank, It’s 
Out With the Old Money and In With the New, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2002, at A10. 
 51. See generally ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A HISTORY OF THE DOLLAR (Colum. Univ. 
Press 1957). 
 52. For a brief history on the development of the Euro, see Kathy Jones & Alan N. 
Rechtschaffen, The Euro—Ready of Not: Trading Implications of the New Common 
Currency, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 786, 790 (1999). 
 53. As discussed below, this Article advocates that states retain power to charge 
more in allowances for particular emitting conduct than federally required.  Hence, this 
Article sees defining allowances as requiring uniformity but with states retaining latitude 
to require more allowances per unit of GHG emission.  As discussed in the text above, this 
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create a preemptive unitary federal efficiency standard for certain 
categories of goods but, like the current Clean Air Act automobile 
standards, allow California and other piggybacking states the option to 
do even better. 
One other difficult and important preemption-drafting choice will 
likely require explicit and clear resolution.  This concerns the ability of 
states to act more aggressively in reducing GHG emissions under a 
partially preemptive federal law and the problem of resulting unused or 
unsought carbon allowances.54  This problem is most likely to arise in 
connection with regulation of major stationary sources, such as power 
plants and factories, but it could also concern the regulation of sources 
like commercial and municipal transportation fleets or other significant 
categories of GHG emissions.  Major stationary sources of pollution are 
already subject to numerous regulatory obligations under the Clean Air 
Act.  State and local governments also have long had broad discretion to 
determine issues of local operation and transportation impacts, hours of 
operation, siting, and even the mandating of more stringently reduced 
levels of pollution than those initially set as a federal floor.55  Federal 
delegated program schemes have similarly made clear that federal clean 
air legislation is merely a floor, allowing for additional and more 
protective state and local actions.  Federal law has never supplanted 
these traditional state and local roles. 
But should state and local authorities be able to pursue more 
aggressive climate change goals by requiring a stationary source (or 
other GHG emitters) to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to what is 
technologically possible in ways akin to best available technology 
performance standards under the Clean Air Act?56  Due to the co-
pollutant problem and many other legitimate state and local land use and 
environmental concerns, state and local governments almost certainly 
have to retain this authority, even if a polluter has or could secure federal 
option is necessary if state regulation is to retain any efficacy in reducing GHG emissions in a 
world where emissions (or emissions allowances) might move to other jurisdictions. 
 54. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 703 (noting this problem). 
 55. See Buzbee, supra note 39, at 1564-68. 
 56. For discussion of technology-based standards, especially their benefits despite 
their apparent crudity compared to incentive-based instruments, see Sidney A. Shapiro & 
Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 
1991 DUKE L.J. 729 (1991) and Wendy Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based 
Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 86 (2000). 
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carbon allowances above those allowed by state or local law.  This 
relates to the “inextricability” problem addressed in the following Part. 
The conundrum is at the next step: should state and local governments 
be able to prohibit not only that higher rate of pollution, but also the sale 
of unused allowances, preclude a pollution source from profiting from 
foregone GHG emissions, or, through other means, take such allowances 
out of circulation?  The difficult question concerns what the facility can 
do with those excess emission allowances or never-emitted emissions.  
Similarly, should state and local governments retain power to pursue 
more aggressive GHG-reduction goals by requiring facilities within the 
jurisdiction to utilize a higher number or rate of allowances for a 
particular activity than that which is the federal norm?  This, too, is a 
strategy to force reductions in GHGs and preclude the movement (or 
leakage) of that quantity of GHGs to other, more lax jurisdictions.57 
This question is difficult because such state and local actions regulating 
GHG emissions more stringently than federal law and prohibiting 
trading benefits would not literally be under another cap-and-trade 
program, but they would affect the federal cap-and-trade market.58  
Depending on how allowances are initially distributed, stringent state 
regulation (via direct regulation or a higher required allowance rate) 
combined with a prohibition on sale of excess allowances, could influence 
the market price for allowances by increasing or decreasing their value. 
In addition, the reward to an emission source for avoiding emissions 
would be lessened by such a state law.  Thus, to allow this sort of state 
and local action would affect the federal market and modify the 
incentives and rewards for pollution-reducing innovations.  Reducing the 
number of allowances on the market would increase their price, creating 
incentives for greater efficiency and related innovations.  However, 
more costly allowances would undercut short-term, cost-effectiveness 
goals.  Due to these price effects, state power of this sort must be 
explicitly addressed if it is to be allowed.  Without an express grant, 
preemption challenges by polluters are likely.59 
If such additional state climate change efforts were preempted, 
however, the effect would be to hobble state and local efforts to foster 
more rapid GHG reductions.  If any state or local action to require better 
performance than federally required always resulted in either sellable 
allowances or reduced demand for allowances that others could then buy 
 57. See Wiener, supra note 1, at 1971-73 (discussing the problems of leakage). 
 58. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 702-703 (discussing how state initiatives could 
interfere with the incentives of a federal cap-and-trade scheme); Glicksman & Levy, 
supra note 39, at 642-43. 
 59. See infra Part III(B) (discussing risks of preemption litigation and broadly 
preemptive results if federal climate does not contain strong savings clause provisions). 
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for less, then state and local government efforts to make additional 
climate progress would be for naught. 
 
Solutions are therefore to: 
1. allow state and local governments to impose an additional 
allowance charge or tax on emissions of GHGs, which would 
permit state and local governments to, in effect, charge more in 
federal allowances per ton of GHGs than assumed in the 
creation and trading of federal allowances; 
2. allow state and local governments by regulation to require 
pollution sources to meet required emissions levels, regardless 
of GHG effects and the number of allowances held by a source; 
3. allow state and local governments to compel the retirement of 
excess allowances held as a result of stringent regulatory action, 
thereby taking those unused allowances out of circulation; or 
4.  make states the distributor of auctioned GHG allowances with 
authority to retire some.  If carbon allowances are auctioned, 
then some leakage is likely and perhaps unavoidable, unless 
states are handed a central role in distributing allowances, 
including authority to withhold allowances under some 
statewide allowance budget.  A state that chooses to require its 
own citizens and sources to emit less, but with no other 
constraining regulatory action, would merely result in fewer 
purchased allowances, leaving those allowances available for 
other states and sources at a lower cost.  Such an outcome 
would frustrate state efforts to make greater GHG progress than 
under the federal cap-and-trade allocations.  Only if states could 
obtain their share of allowances based on some baseline 
calculation and then retire a percentage of them could the 
migration of allowances to a less regulated jurisdiction leakage 
problem be avoided under an auctioned allowance scenario. 
Unless state powers were specifically preserved under one or all of 
these powers, the retained state and local power to address climate 
change would likely prove illusory.  Any levels of pollution below that 
which is federally assumed or allowed would merely result in the 
shifting of carbon allowances to other polluters outside the jurisdiction.  
Once again, all GHG reductions and related climate progress would 
depend on the effectiveness of federal law.  If state and local governments 
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are to be agents of progress, it is critical to protect state and local 
government authority to impose more stringent GHG obligations and 
preclude polluter profit-making from those additional reductions required 
by state law.  Since state or local actions would be impinging on 
otherwise available allowance trading, they could be seen as interfering 
with the six-year period of an exclusively federal cap-and-trade regime.  
For this reason, such authority would need to be granted with near 
explicit language.60 
D.  Climate Preemption and the Inextricability Problem 
Any efforts to construct a partially preemptive federal climate change 
law confront a challenge that I refer to as the “inextricability” problem.  
The same ubiquity of GHG sources that makes a climate cap-and-trade 
scheme a good idea makes attempted preemption difficult.  After all, 
actions causing or having an effect on GHGs and climate change are 
pervasive.  Thus, statutory language leaving pro-preemption advocates 
room to argue for preemptive outcomes could pose major risks to broad 
swaths of state and local regulatory authority due to the inextricability 
problem.  Simply stated, virtually all combustion of fossil fuels results in 
GHG emissions, as do uses of many solvents and chemicals.  The layout 
of cities, transportation options, and rate regulation of power plants also 
influence GHG-emission levels.  The stringency (or laxity) of building 
codes as well as conservation and efficiency mandates are hugely 
important.  Any permitting of a new or expanded stationary source of 
pollution will influence resulting GHG emissions.  Green space 
preservation also has direct GHG linkages in both reducing emissions 
associated with deforestation and likely also absorbing carbon dioxide 
and thereby acting as a carbon sink.  Furthermore, many basic 
environmental risks, such as particulate matter, hazardous air pollutants, 
and other criteria pollutants under section 108 of the Clean Air Act, are 
also GHGs or pollutants emitted along with GHGs.  Such accompanying 
pollutants are often referred to as “co-pollutants.”  Renewable portfolio 
standards, a policy adopted by many states, have many goals, and one of 
them is often the reduction of GHGs.  Tax burdens will influence 
incentives where people choose to live, work, or invest, as do subsidies 
and positive, monetary incentives.  All of these sorts of actions and 
regulatory choices influence the resulting carbon footprint.  To summarize, 
 60. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 39, at 609-10 (advocating a “strong judicial 
presumption against ceiling preemption under federal environmental statutes in the 
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state and local policies that directly and indirectly relate to GHG emissions 
and that could affect GHG allowance markets are innumerable. 
Since thousands of actions by state and local governments can have 
goals other than climate change, or have a climate change focus among 
numerous other goals, the question is what a preemptive federal law 
would entail.  These many-identified state and local actions as well as 
many, many others would directly or indirectly influence resulting levels 
of GHGs.  They might also influence a polluter’s ability to make changes 
that could benefit them through carbon-allowance trading.  They would 
unquestionably “relate to” GHGs or climate change and would also 
likely affect the overall market for CO2 allowances. 
To work, a partially, or purportedly completely, preemptive federal 
climate law would somehow need to weed out traditional, permitted 
areas of state and local power.  Especially under obstacle preemption 
logic detailed below, any preemption language that is not closely 
tailored with explicit, focused language could result in preemption 
claims against thousands of government actions inextricably linked to 
climate change.  Once again, the price of ambiguity and policy uncertainties 
could be unpredictable, expansive claims about the preemptive reach of 
federal law. 
The next Part analyzes preemption jurisprudence, demonstrating how 
statutory ambiguity on the preemption question could result in a vastly 
expanded preemptive impact. 
III.  WHEN CLIMATE LEGISLATION MEETS THE PREEMPTION 
JURISPRUDENCE SWORD 
Compromise is often the glue that cements legislative majorities.  By 
leaving disputes unresolved and accepting a degree of linguistic 
ambiguity for later resolution before agencies and courts, partisans may 
support a bill.61  Clear language, in contrast, may make the winners and 
losers too clear to assemble a workable supportive legislative coalition.  
Preemption choices are no different, especially where a bill involves a 
challenge as massive as combating climate change.  But the efficacy of 
 61. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 
(1984) (setting forth the “two-step” framework for judicial review of agency statutory 
interpretations and discussing reasons Congress may leave or create statutory gaps or 
ambiguities); see also Kirsten Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in 
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 184 (2006) (“Federal preemption can be considered 
an unpleasant by-product of interest group lawmaking.”). 
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legislative language depends on underlying interpreting frameworks and 
the voyage on which a statute will embark.62  The degree of acceptable 
ambiguity and policy choice uncertainty, and the effects of such ambiguity 
and uncertainty, will vary greatly depending on the underlying body of 
interpretive norms and law. 
Preemption jurisprudence presents a particularly challenging problem.  
The oft-stated prevailing interpretive presumption is the “presumption 
against preemption,” seemingly disfavoring preemptive outcomes and 
putting the onus on pro-preemption forces to secure explicit pro-
preemption language.63  The applied reality, however, is actually 
unpredictable and often friendly to pro-preemption results.  A growing 
strain in Supreme Court and Court of Appeals precedents reveals 
sympathy for preemptive outcomes.  The courts’ stated reasons closely 
track “rule of law” virtues, especially the desire for certainty, but these 
increasingly preemptive results are perhaps also explained by anti-
regulatory and pro-business preferences.64  As Professor Young and 
others have observed, outside of floor preemption structures, preemption 
tends to be anti-regulatory in impact and is sought for that reason.65  
Despite abundant scholarly commentary explaining the virtues of non-
preemptive regimes, judicial preemption precedents in recent years tend 
to embrace preemption.66 
 62. Cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 20 (1988) (developing the nautical metaphor to describe how the process of 
interpretation will over time change the meaning ascribed to a statute). 
 63. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“[W]e start with 
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded . . . 
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”).  For works discussing the 
“presumption against preemption,” see Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against 
Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 709-710 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 741-42 (2008); Schroeder, 
supra note 34, at 122-23; and Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An 
Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 455-59 (2008). 
 64. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1020 (2008) (holding that a 
federal statute preempted state tort action against a medical device manufacturer); 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 532 (2001) (holding that a federal statute 
preempted state regulation of tobacco advertising); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 
U.S. 861, 865 (2000) (holding that a federal regulation preempted state common-law 
defective design action); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 94 (2000) (holding that a 
federal regulation preempted state regulation of oil tankers). 
 65.  See Ernest A. Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL 
PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 249, 263 (Richard A. Epstein & 
Michael S. Greve eds., 2007); Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 869 (2008). 
 66. See Buzbee, supra note 39; McGarity, supra note 32; Young, supra note 66; 
see also sources cited, supra note 32, 39, 63 & 65 (discussing the merits of changing 
preemption policy trends in the executive branch and courts). 
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This problematic pro-preemption case law contains several key 
elements.  Courts, especially the Supreme Court, often selectively ignore 
the “presumption against preemption;” savings clauses are given little or 
no weight; and preempted conflicts are readily found, even in laws 
lacking express preemptive language.67  Few preemption precedents 
develop a normative strain recognizing the benefits of retaining state and 
local authority in addition to related federal law.68 
Perhaps most significantly, as explored below, the Supreme Court and 
following lower courts have begun to develop a growing “obstacle 
preemption” jurisprudence where a direct conflict need not be shown for 
preemptive outcomes; rather, challenges must merely demonstrate that a 
state or local law strikes a different balance than federal law.  Because 
any state involvement in a field that is also subject to federal regulation 
is likely to reflect different priorities than federal law, a different balance 
is a near inevitability.  Such a different balance could lead federal actors 
or affected industry to use preemption case law as a sword to displace 
state or local law.  Finally, agencies may play a critical interpretive role 
in construing statutes to preempt or authorize preemption; those agency 
actions may receive judicial deference, meaning that a pro-preemption 
president or agency might strategically use ambiguous language to 
expand the realm of preempted law.69 
Collectively, these preemption precedents create a setting whereby 
any intended anti-preemptive results in climate legislation will require 
statutory drafting of uncommon clarity.  Without it, claims of conflict 
preemption, especially obstacle preemption, will arise with great frequency.  
This Part is not claiming that pro-preemption results are a certainty but, 
 67. See infra Parts III(A)-(C). 
 68. Two notable and important exceptions are Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 
U.S. 431 (2005) and Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).  Both cases discuss why 
there are benefits of retaining federal regulatory oversight and state common law regimes.  As 
I have explored elsewhere, Wyeth and several other cases together create doctrinal 
support for courts to subject the factual and policy claims underlying agency claims of 
preemptive power and effect to “hard look review.” See William W. Buzbee, Preemption 
Hard Look Review, Regulatory Interaction, and Quest for Stewardship and 
Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1521 (2009). 
 69. See Mendelson, supra note 63 (discussing this possibility in her article focusing on 
whether agencies should receive deference for statutory interpretations underlying preemption 
claims); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 
DUKE L.J. 2125 (2009) (discussing agency assertions of preemptive impact and suggesting 




BUZBEE 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2016  10:56 AM 
 
instead, that the underlying law is in disarray.  The growing strain of 
pro-preemption logic means that statutory ambiguities could over time 
result in agency interpretations and cases leaving little room for 
independent state and local climate policies.  As shown below, retaining 
state and local roles is both difficult to avoid and desirable in order to 
further the goal of combating climate change. 
A.  The Erratic Voyage of the “Presumption Against Preemption” 
The dominant-stated interpretive norm about preemption is the 
“presumption against preemption.”  As explained in numerous cases, 
this norm is meant to favor the preservation of state law despite federal 
law’s constitutional supremacy.70  This anti–preemption norm is rooted 
in the Constitution’s federalist structures and the value of preserving 
legal domains for state law.  This heightened attention to preserving state 
law links to the many cases emphasizing the importance of state 
sovereignty. 
Despite the durability and frequent reiteration of this norm, the 
Supreme Court, in reality, states and applies it only sporadically.71  In 
Riegel v. Medtronic72 and Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,73 the 
Court did not even mention this anti-preemption presumption and ended 
up embracing preemptive outcomes.  In addition, the Court has neglected 
this presumption in interpreting statutes that lack express preemption 
provisions.74 
Many laws do contain preemptive language, making judicial neglect 
of the anti-preemption norm less surprising, but even there, the question 
is how broadly to construe preemptive language.  In particular, should 
express preemption of conflicting “requirements” include preemption of 
the possibility of common law liabilities if the law does not mention 
common law?  On that issue, the Supreme Court has in recent years 
seesawed, with the Court’s vacillation tracking the Court’s stated 
application or rejection of the “presumption against preemption.”  For 
example, the most recent major preemption decision, Wyeth v. Levine,75 
 70. Medronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 71. See Sharkey, supra note 63, at 458-59; see also Calvin Massey, “Joltin’ Joe 
Has Left and Gone Away”: The Vanishing Presumption Against Preemption, 66 ALB. L. 
REV. 759, 764 (2003) (“[T]he Court . . . continues to simultaneously repeat and ignore 
the presumption against preemption.”); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 
298 (2000) (“The Court itself has applied the presumption only half-heartedly.”). 
 72. Riegel v. Medtronic, 128 S. Ct. 999, 1006 (2008). 
 73. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000). 
 74. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002); Geier, 529 U.S. at 906. 
 75. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
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both defended application of this anti-preemption presumption and 
reached an anti-preemption result.  This outcome in Wyeth, however, 
surely does not resolve this question.  Wyeth reflects what is the latest of 
a series of close 5-4 preemption decisions applying inconsistent 
frameworks and reaching different results based on claimed differences 
in underlying facts, statutory language, and bodies of regulation.  The 
slightly earlier Riegel v. Medtronic went decisively the other way, and 
the 2005 Bates76 decision was more consistent with Wyeth.77 
The bottom line is that the “presumption against preemption” no 
longer is applied predictably or consistently.  Federal climate legislation 
cannot rely on this presumption to tip the interpretive scale against 
preemption. 
B.  The Much-Neglected Savings Clauses 
Many statutes contain provisions that “save” state law.  With varying 
degrees of specificity, they make clear that a federal law or perhaps a 
portion of a federal law is not to be implemented or construed to 
preempt existing state law.  As Professor Zellmer makes clear in her 
chapter in Preemption Choice, savings clauses have frequently been 
given little to no weight or attention in major Supreme Court preemption 
decisions.78  The Court has explicitly said that findings of conflict 
preemption are not precluded by the presence of a savings clause.79  In 
addition, since some laws contain both preemptive provisions and 
savings clauses, the mere presence of a savings clause does not 
necessarily shift interpretative modes into a strongly anti-preemptive 
stance.  This body of law makes clear that if a savings clause is to have 
an anti-preemptive effect, it needs to be strongly and specifically 
worded.  Because the presence of a savings clause does not preclude a 
finding of a preempted conflict and because the growing body of 
obstacle preemption has expanded what counts as a conflict, additional 
 76. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005). 
 77. These cases and related precedents are analyzed closely in suggesting agency 
preemption claims should be subjected to hard look review in Buzbee, supra note 68, at 
1557-76. 
 78. Sandi Zellmer, When Congress Goes Unheard: Saving Clauses’ Rocky Judicial 
Reception, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 34, at 144, 164-166 (William W. Buzbee 
ed., 2009). 
 79. Geier, 529 U.S. at 870. 
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statutory findings or policy provisions expressly explaining why state 
law should be preserved are also likely necessary. 
C. The Rise of “Obstacle” Preemption and the                                      
Problem of Multiple Goal Statutes 
Although much of preemption jurisprudence concerns interpretation of 
statutory language bearing on the preemption question, conflicts can and 
will arise between federal and state law, regardless of the subject of 
regulation.  Little dispute concerns conflicts involving impossibly clashing 
requirements, especially clashing design mandates.  Such “physical 
impossibility conflict” requires a resolution, and the Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause makes clear that federal law trumps state law. 
Less obvious and more problematic for climate legislation is the 
growing body of “obstacle preemption” law.  If a state law’s functioning 
stands as an obstacle to purposes evident in a federal law, or perhaps 
strikes a different balance regarding competing federal purposes, courts 
may find it preempted under obstacle preemption doctrine.  Hence, in 
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,80 the Court found that the possibility 
of tort liability for a car’s lack of an airbag was preempted under 
obstacle preemption theory because of federal regulation chose a phase-
in period for air bags.  Tort liability “would have stood as an obstacle to 
the gradual, passive restraint phase-in that the federal regulation 
deliberately imposed.”81  In one of its earliest applications, in Hines v. 
Davidovitz,82 the Court invalidated a state regulation imposing more 
requirements on aliens than federal law because such state laws “stand 
as an obstacle to the full purpose and objectives of Congress.”83  The 
growing body of obstacle preemption cases vary in whether a preemptive 
result is reached, but the question remains the same: are the different or 
additional state or local regulatory burdens an obstacle to the balance 
struck by federal law? 
If judges or justices frame the preemption question as whether state 
law or actions are contrary to “the balance struck” in federal law, they 
are near certain to favor or reach pro-preemption outcomes.84  If that is 
 80. Id. at 881. 
 81. Id.  For a concise but thorough discussion of Geier and obstacle preemption 
doctrine, see Schroeder, supra note 34, at 132-35. 
 82. 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
 83. Id. at 66-74. 
 84. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1221 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that federal drug labels should preclude state common law from striking a different balance 
than federal actions); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (finding Illinois takeover 
law preempted by the federal Williams Act due to how state law differed from 
the “balance struck” in federal law); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., v. Paul, 
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the question, the frame for analysis is weighted heavily towards 
preemption since any different state and local choices, by definition, will 
strike a different balance.  If a law “interferes with the methods by which 
the federal statute was designed to reach [the federal] goal,” then it can 
be preempted under obstacle preemption logic even where the state or 
local law seeks to achieve the same primary goal as federal law.85  As 
Justice Thomas wrote in his Wyeth concurrence, where he issued a 
direct, withering attack on the whole doctrinal concept of obstacle 
preemption, obstacle preemption is unpredictable and empowers judges 
to exercise broad policy discretion.86 
The 2003 Second Circuit decision in Clean Air Markets Group v. 
Pataki (CAMG) is especially illuminating in assessing climate-change 
obstacle-preemption risks.87  CAMG involved the sulfur dioxide acid 
rain cap-and-trade program under the Clean Air Act.  When New York 
tried to restrict trading of SO2 allowances to polluters in upwind states, 
an association representing those polluters claimed that New York State 
was preempted from taking actions that burdened trading under the 
Clean Air Act.  The Second Circuit agreed.  Noting how burdening of 
SO2 trades would undercut the cost-effectiveness goals of the cap-and-
trade regime, the court expressed, “[T]here can be no doubt that the 
[state law] interferes with the method selected by Congress for 
regulating SO2 emissions.”88  By parsing the statute’s language and the 
history of related implementing regulations, the court concluded that 
New York restrictions on trades were contrary to federal law and a 
preempted obstacle “even if . . . it [did] not ‘actually conflict with 
federal law because it [was] expressly permitted by” the Clean Air Act’s 
floor preemption savings clauses.89  The court concluded that the state 
law “impedes the execution of ‘the full purposes and objectives’ of Title 
IV[’s acid rain cap-and-trade system].”90  
373 U.S. 132, 171 (1963) (White, J., dissenting) (using “the balance struck” terminology 
in arguing the Court majority should have found that federal marketing orders preempted 
state law differently regulating avocado sales). 
 85. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494-97 (1987).  In Ouellette, the Court’s 
application of obstacle preemption ultimately led it to a choice of law decision, applying 
state common law of the pollution source’s state, not the law of the victim’s state. 
 86. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1214-28 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 87. Clean Air Markets Group v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82, 86-89 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 88. Id. at 87. 
 89. Id. at 89. 
 90. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidovitz, 471 U.S. at 713). 
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Obstacle preemption is thus a particular problem for climate-change 
legislation and the preservation of state roles.  A federal cap-and-trade 
law will almost inevitably result from compromises about the pace of 
progress and a desire to balance environmental goals and costs, or it will, 
at least, minimize costs to achieve a designated climate goal.  Any state 
law directly or indirectly relating to climate change and GHG emissions 
will necessarily strike a different balance reflecting that jurisdiction’s 
more environmentally aggressive priorities. Obstacle preemption doctrine 
could result in preemption of state efforts, unless federal law in savings 
clauses and policy as well as findings provisions expressly allows  
additional or more rapid state and local efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions.  Also helpful would be provisions that identify other benefits 
of preserving state and local regulatory power in order to address climate 
change.  Such a law would also have to avoid  broad or indeterminate 
preempting language such as “related to” due to the broad way such a 
provision would be interpreted.91 
D.  Agency Interpretation in the Climate Change                           
Preemption Crucible 
As evident in Geier, Wyeth, and numerous agency declarations and 
actions late in the recent Bush Administration, agencies can use their 
implementation and interpretive discretion to assert their view that some 
state or local action, law or regulation, or even common law is 
preempted.  The Supreme Court has clearly stated that agency actions 
can be the federal law that preempts92 but has yet to resolve a 
longstanding debate regarding whether federal agency declarations about 
preemptive impact are subject to deferential judicial reviewing 
frameworks.  The recent Wyeth case is dismissive of claims of 
preemptive impact asserted in a regulatory preamble without advance 
notice and opportunity for public input, thus perhaps impliedly indicating 
that more process would justify greater deference.93  Several recent 
decisions expressly do not resolve this question. 
If ambiguities left in federal law empower federal agencies to assert 
preemptive impact and receive judicial deference, then poorly resolved 
preemption choices in climate legislation could lead a pro-preemption 
administration to broaden the preemptive reach of a federal climate law 
and limit state authority.  Once again, the price of ambiguity and 
 91. In Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008), the Supreme Court made 
clear that preemptive language including the phrase “relating to” “indicates Congress’ 
[sic] intent to pre-empt a large area of state law to further its purpose.”  Id. at 548-49. 
 92. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). 
 93. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200-02 (2009). 
52 
 
BUZBEE 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2016  10:56 AM 
[VOL. 1:  23, 2009]  State Greenhouse Gas Regulation 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY LAW 
uncertainties resulting from compromise might be a climate-change law 
that, in ultimate application and interpretation, becomes broadly preemptive. 
IV.  WHY STATE AND LOCAL CLIMATE ROLES ARE DESIRABLE 
The major arguments for preserving state and local climate-change 
authority logically flow from the preceding sections.  Several others also 
deserve attention. 
Preserving state and local authority despite a federal climate-change 
law can serve as a partial antidote to several likely forms of regulatory 
failure discussed in Part I.  If federal law proves to be too lax either in 
the level of its cap or in the rate of progress, state and local governments 
could choose to take supplemental, more stringent actions.  These, 
concededly, would burden those regulated more than under federal law 
alone.  This ability of state and local governments to take more stringent 
actions could, nevertheless, prove critical and beneficial in several 
respects.  First, widespread state and local actions could reduce the 
nation’s aggregate emissions, thereby leading to environmental progress 
despite what might be an unduly lax federal law.  Second, a groundswell 
of additional and possibly different state and local climate-change efforts 
could, once again, play a critical role in catalyzing support for additional 
or amended federal legislation.94  Industry hoping to avoid too many 
diverse state and local initiatives might support federal legal change.  If 
state and local actors were legally precluded from action, then progress 
could falter and the states-as-catalyst dynamic would be lost.95 
In addition, federal law could fail if a lack of monitoring and 
enforcement destroyed the integrity of the new carbon-allowance 
market.  Empowering state and local governments to play their own 
supplementary roles in enforcing the law could be the equivalent of 
additional cops on the beat.96  With higher rates of monitoring, detection 
of violations, and punishment, rates of compliance would likely increase.  
Correspondingly, retaining overlapping and cooperative state and local 
climate regulation roles would result in state and local governments 
continuing to gain GHG regulation expertise.  With that experience 
 94. See sources cited, supra note 4. 
 95. See generally Kaswan, supra note 46.  
 96. See Andreen, supra note 5 (discussing diverse state climate initiatives); Engel, 
supra note 61, at 178-81 (discussing regulatory safety nets); Schapiro, supra note 
35, at 44 (articulating the benefits of regulatory redundancy). 
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might come ideas for ways to improve federal law.97  If at the end of the 
period of preemptive federal cap-and-trade exclusivity states desired to 
initiate their own additional GHG regulation and trading regime, the 
start-up hurdles would be less formidable. 
Preserving state and local climate roles would also leave room to 
engage in policy innovation and experimentation.98  A federal cap-and-
trade regime might prove highly effective, but additional measures are 
sure to be needed.  Apart from the broadly shared goal of creating a 
liquid and thriving carbon-trading market—a goal assisted by a single 
federal trading market—many other strategies could also prove effective 
in reducing GHG emissions.  Pollution trading is a promising way to 
find cost-effective means to meet a pollution goal but, by definition, 
does not prod polluters to extend beyond the cap’s required aggregate 
reductions.  Numerous other regulatory strategies can also help reduce 
GHG emissions, as they have long helped address other environmental 
ills.  The optimal mix of mandates, technology forcing, incentive-based 
tools such as taxes and subsidies, site-specific imposition of rigorous 
performance goals, among many other strategies, is not yet known.  
Giving state and local governments latitude to experiment serves to 
diversify the risks posed by a single, federal regulatory monopoly.  Even 
a trading regime could benefit from different state or regional 
experiences in setting up their own markets.  The several state and 
regional carbon-trading regimes in place at this time utilize somewhat 
different strategies.99  Provided that the tradable GHG allowances and 
credits are sufficiently uniform to facilitate trades across jurisdictional 
borders, the content and institutional arrangements under cap-and-trade 
regimes would likely also benefit from allowing diverse strategies; the 
federal regime, other states, and possibly other nations, all could learn by 
comparing the efficacy, in actual implementation, of diverse approaches 
to GHG regulation and even cap-and-trade regulatory strategies. 
State and local governments also provide additional venues in which 
citizens and stakeholders can participate and nudge governments and 
polluters to improve.  Federal regulatory venues can be invaluable, but 
different sorts of participation and input, often at lower cost, may be 
facilitated by preservation of state and local government roles.  
Similarly, federal actors may be uninterested in smaller-scale subjects of 
 97. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 700 (discussing how state initiates could lead to 
more stringent federal regulation). 
 98. See William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk 
Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 152-55 (2007); Engel, 
supra note 61, at 182-83; Schapiro, supra note 35, at 43. 
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regulation that could easily be reached at more local levels.  Hence, state 
and local regulatory roles could serve to enhance participation while also 
filling in regulatory gaps left in federal law. 
Even without federal error, reliance on a single regulator poses high 
risks of stasis.  The regulatory temptation to take an action and not 
revisit it has long been noted, leading to calls for regulatory look-back, 
creation of regulatory “hammers” incentivizing regulatory reexamination, 
and imposition of statutory deadlines.100  Any regulatory reexamination 
poses risks of revealing imprudence, error, and ineffective regulation.  
Furthermore, recent precedents greatly strengthen government defenses 
to lawsuits intended to address agency inaction.  Unless either an 
enabling act grants a particular cause of action to address inaction or a 
law mandates “required” and “discrete” actions, courts cannot prompt an 
agency to act.101 
Despite these barriers to prompting federal action, if state and local 
governments retain latitude for their own additional and different climate 
strategies, then stakeholders have another venue in which to pursue their 
ideas.  Diverse state and local strategies may reveal effective measures 
that then can be copied by other states and, possibly, federal regulators.  
One need not wishfully rely on selfless federal actors eager to both 
engage in self-criticism and subject themselves to more work in order to 
reveal and test new ideas; state and local actions can establish new 
possibilities.  Retaining a diversity of actors and latitude for diverse 
regulatory arrangements can, thus, serve to foster “democratic 
experimentalism” and “learning by monitoring,” with others able to 
learn from benchmarked best practices.102 This is true for GHG 
mitigation strategies and, as shown in a forthcoming article by Professor 
Camacho,103 adaptation strategies.  The price of misguided strategies 
also is far lower if state and local governments can give new strategies a 
test run.  As Professor Carlson observes, California has often used its 
 100. See, e.g., CURTIS COPELAND, U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
REEXAMINING RULES: SECTION 610 OF THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT (2005), 
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/2360/RL32801_20050311.pdf?
sequence=1. 
 101. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 65 (2004). 
 102. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 287-88 (1998). 
 103. See generally Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate 
Change: Learning to Manage Uncertainty, 59 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2009), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pap ers.cfm?abstract_id=1352693. 
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special Clean Air Act powers to innovate in helpful ways, but it has also 
helped avoid larger-scale national mistakes due to experience gained 
from failed state strategies.104 
V.  PREEMPTION CRITERIA AND THE VALUE OF A PREEMPTION             
REVIEW COMMITTEE 
Despite this Article’s arguments against preempting state and local 
government climate change roles, it remains virtually unavoidable that 
conflicts will arise between federal and state and local law.  It is also 
likely that, in order to assemble an adequate coalition that will support 
federal climate legislation, at least limited preemption language will be 
necessary.  This Part suggests how to design limited preemptive 
provisions that reduce the risk of stasis and error while retaining the 
potential benefits of state and local action.  This Part also suggests that 
federal law should create a Preemption Review Committee as the initial 
venue in which to hear preemption claims by federal officials or private 
actors. 
A. Minimal Preemptive Language 
The most justifiable preemptive language would create a single, 
federally designed carbon dioxide allowance.  Because there are numerous 
GHGs with different climate effects, and because offsets will also arise 
out of different activities, a federal law would need to attribute values to 
these climate-related emissions and offsets.  Legislatively dictating these 
equivalencies and ratios would hasten implementation of the law but 
would pose substantial risks of error and stasis.  Ideally, federal climate 
legislation would set, to the extent feasible based on the best-available 
data, ratios and equivalencies; it would also address the stasis risk by 
creating an agency obligation to reexamine these assumptions every 
few years and also provide for a petition process whereby anyone could 
prompt a revisiting of these carbon allowance and offset values.105  
Preserving broad participation rights and requiring agency responses to 
such petitions would also reduce the risk of agency stasis. 
Second, creating a single national cap-and-trade regime would serve 
to focus all on one market, reducing transaction costs and helping to 
create a single clearinghouse for information and trades.  A single 
 104. Carlson, supra note 43. 
 105. Oddly, the Waxman-Markey climate bill draft of June 5, 2009 was careful to 
create a petition process for allowance equivalencies and designation of GHGs but did 
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domestic carbon market would also ease integration into international 
trading regimes.  Further, it would simplify efforts to monitor the market 
and certify trades, claimed underlying emissions levels, and offset 
activities.  The risk, as stated above, is that the cap would be too high or 
slow to decrease and also that something about the market’s structure 
would prove dysfunctional.  Correspondingly, lack of monitoring and 
enforcement could undercut the market’s integrity and destroy the value 
of carbon allowances.  If the single national market would permanently 
preempt other levels of government, only federal legislative or agency 
willingness to fix the market could rectify problems. 
The best resolution to risks of a single national cap-and-trade market 
is what appears likely in the leading climate change bill.  Creating a 
single, preemptive federal cap-and-trade market while limiting the 
duration of its preemptive effect would give the federal regime a chance 
to get rolling.  A period of federal exclusivity would also prompt all 
parties to work out the kinks in the federal regime rather than abandon it 
for some other legal regime or market.  By giving the federal market 
preemptive exclusivity for several years, even opponents of climate 
legislation would have incentives to make the federal law work so that 
states and regions would not revive or create their own cap-and-trade 
markets at the end of the preemptive period.  In addition, much as 
allowance-creation should be subject to agency reexamination and 
stakeholder petition rights for modification via notice and comment 
processes, a federal cap-and-trade market should have its own similar 
mechanisms to address flaws and institute improvements.  Thus, 
although a limited preemptive phase would be part of the law, administrative 
reexamination and amendment procedures could address risks of error, 
even if the protections of federalism are temporarily lost.106 
Apart from focusing all on a single, federal GHG currency and a 
single, federal market for a limited time, state and local roles should be 
broadly preserved via savings clauses and findings as well as policy 
provisions that document reasons to allow additional state and local 
actions that could not only directly or indirectly relate to GHG 
emissions, but also possibly affect the federal cap-and-trade market.  
Due to the ubiquity of activities linked to climate change, broad 
preservation of state and local roles is necessary to avoid a landslide of 
 106. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 2023, 2109 (2008). 
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preemption litigation, where a federal climate law would be used as a 
sword to weaken state and local laws. 
B.  For a Preemption Review Committee and Structured                       
Review of Preemption Claims 
Even with only limited preemptive language and well-crafted savings 
clauses, conflicts will arise and prompt claims that state or local actions 
or laws are preempted.  As discussed above in Part III, preemption 
jurisprudence has become unpredictable. Among its problems lies 
uncertainty among judges regarding how to determine whether a conflict 
that would require preemption actually exists.  Some courts will take 
evidence on this question, as was the case at the trial level in the recent 
Wyeth v. Levine decision, which the Supreme Court majority reviewed in 
depth when it declined to preempt state tort law.  In other cases, however, 
courts often focus just on the statutory interpretation question and give 
little attention the realities of the claimed conflict.107 In those cases, 
judicial views about the value of regulation and, especially, regulatory 
overlap and interaction seem more important than actual evidence about 
a conflict. In addition, as mentioned above, courts often barely give 
attention to the presence of savings provisions.  As generalists, it is 
doubtful that courts often know about the benefits of regulatory 
interaction and overlap, especially in particular regulatory settings.  
Instead, courts are likely mainly to hear the complaints of industry that is 
unhappy with additional obligations or liabilities imposed by state or 
local law.108 
 107. See generally Buzbee, supra note 68, at 1553-80 (discussing frequent judicial 
and scholarly focus on the question of agency statutory authority to preempt, and deriving 
doctrinal and policy arguments for more closely scrutinizing the factual and policy 
rationales for preemption under a “hard look review” framework); Sharkey, supra note 
69, at 2178-91 (discussing ways courts could encourage agencies to make preemption 
judgments in a more transparent and accountable manner). 
 108. A recent congressional report on Food and Drug Administration pro-preemption 
declarations reveals that career officials disputed the empirical basis for political appointees’ 
pro-preemption claims about conflicts between regulatory obligations and tort law. 
MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, FDA CAREER STAFF 
OBJECTED TO AGENCY PREEMPTION POLICIES 4 (2008), http://oversight.house.gov/documents/ 
20081029102934.pdf.  In two related cases before the Supreme Court, Riegel v. Medtronic, 
128 S. Ct. 999, 1010-11 (2008) and Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1877, 1219-20 (2009) 
(Alito, J., dissenting), five and then three justices, respectively, largely adopted the anti-
tort, pro-preemption views embraced by political leadership at the FDA and favored by 
industry, but which in reality had been rejected as empirically unsound by career staff experts.  
The justices took this perspective with little or no empirical support.  The majority in 
Wyeth rejected this approach.  In the climate arena, the Preemption Review Committee idea 
proposed here is meant to reduce the risk that judges, justices, and agency officials will 
resolve preemption claims based on intuition and political preferences. 
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Three simple means can be taken to address this judicial tendency to 
make conclusory preemption findings without adequate consideration of 
underlying evidence.  The first is for the Supreme Court to call for “hard 
look” review of evidence underlying government or private sector 
claims that alleged conflicts with federal law require preemption.109  A 
second option is for Congress to make clear in judicial review provisions 
that agency or private claims of preemptive effect require submission of 
evidence as well as either a hearing or a notice and comment process 
prior to agency or judicial resolution of a preemption claim. 
The third means involves creating a Preemption Review Committee 
composed of top federal officials and, perhaps, also including a few 
state-appointed representatives.  It would be modeled after the Endangered 
Species Committee (ESC), also known as the “God Squad.”  The ESC is 
authorized to utilize an on-the-record (but mostly paper) process to 
consider petitions seeking permission to take actions that threaten 
endangered species or their habitats, despite otherwise applicable 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohibitions.110 The ESC’s determinations 
must be based on this on-the-record introduced evidence and, for a 
petition grant, make specific findings under ESA criteria, including 
evidence about the overall benefits and costs of a proposed action.  The 
ESC’s actions are reviewable in the courts based on this underlying 
record and its ruling.  The effect of the ESC is to create a safety valve 
for the ESA’s generally strong prohibitions, but it also tests petitioners 
by requiring proof both of the merits of a project and that means to avoid 
endangered species harms truly do not exist. 
A Climate Change Preemption Review Committee would similarly 
test federal or private actors who claim that state and local action must 
be preempted.  Since several federal agencies would likely be involved 
in implementing and enforcing a federal climate law, the Committee 
would not be composed of officials from only one agency.  And because 
state perspectives on state law would be important, so would be giving 
states a Committee voice.  Even if not actually on the Committee, states 
 109. See Buzbee, supra note 68. 
 110. See generally Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 
F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993) (reviewing the key language and requirements applicable to 
the Committee in challenge to actions of the Endangered Species Committee, especially 
ex parte communication,); Oliver S. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its 
Implementation by the U.S Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 
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would need to have an opportunity to participate since a preemption 
claim would threaten to nullify state law.  Partisans and the Committee 
would not only have to construe federal and state or local laws to show 
that federal law is meant to preempt state or local law (at least, if they 
conflict), but they also would have to show how, in actual application, 
federal and state or local laws or actions create conflicts worthy of 
preemption under the federal law’s criteria.  Those criteria would need to 
include language allowing preemption both in settings of physical 
impossibility and upon proof that a state or local law actually imposes a 
conflict that leads to increased GHG emissions or otherwise exacerbates 
climate change.  Other preemption claims based on allegations of undue 
conflict and unreasonable burdens would need to balance overall 
benefits of retaining state and local regulatory power with particular 
individualized burdens that might arise, with greatest weight given to 
climate change goals.  Again, proof of both the benefits of state and 
local law and resulting harms would be needed.  Only if, overall, state 
and local law created a conflict that in some way undercut federal 
climate change goals could it be held preempted.  The Committee’s 
statutory criteria would also call for declarations of preemptive impact to 
be narrowly tailored, preserving state and local authority to address 
climate change as much as possible. 
By utilizing a Preemption Review Committee, preemption claims 
would not be resolved on an ad hoc basis heavily influenced by general 
views about the value of regulation or gut responses to claims of conflict.  
Statutory criteria would focus the Committee on general benefits of both 
state and local climate efforts while also examining the particular burdens 
claimed.  The Committee’s tailored discretion would, in turn, constrain 
courts from overreaching.  The availability of judicial review, however, 
would remain important in order to ensure that the Committee’s own 
work did not become politicized or inattentive to statutory criteria and 
presumptions. 
At this time, leading federal climate bills do not contain any structure 
like this, but creation of a Preemption Review Committee would create a 
safety valve to address settings where preemption really is needed while 
also constraining and guiding such preemption review by dictating that 
the Committee and any reviewing courts assess actual underlying facts 
in light of statutory criteria.  A subsequent judicial hard look at the 
Committee’s determinations would further support the integrity of the 
process.  Moreover, such a specialized tribunal would, over time, increase 
expertise on climate change preemption conflicts. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Federal climate legislation confronts numerous distinctive risks of 
regulatory failure.  Protecting state and local power to take additional 
and more stringent steps to address climate change preserves incentives 
for stakeholders to address flaws in federal climate legislation while also 
retaining state and local room for policy innovations.  In addition, due to 
the ubiquity of GHG emissions, it is difficult to extricate regulatory 
actions that focus on GHGs from regulation directed at other sorts of 
pollution and risk.  Express preservation of state and local regulatory 
power that impinges on carbon regulation and markets is important to 
preclude industry use of federal climate legislation as a preemption 
sword.  Ambiguous language regarding the preemptive effect of federal 
legislation would be a recipe for decades of preemption litigation.  
Despite the often-stated presumption against preemption, actual recent 
preemption cases reveal preemption jurisprudence that is increasingly 
sympathetic to preemptive outcomes, especially under obstacle 
preemption logic.  To avoid unpredictable preemption litigation and 
preserve state and local roles, statutory preemption criteria and anti-
preemption presumptions would help, as would the creation of a 
Preemption Review Committee to hear and resolve preemption claims.  
The Article also demonstrates how state and local climate roles can only 
be preserved and effective if state and local governments have the 
authority either to retire carbon allowances or to charge more in carbon 
allowances per ton of GHG emissions.  Ideally, state and local 
governments would also play in role in distributing allowances.  Without 
these sorts of authority, state and local stringency would just result in 
leakage of those emissions to other jurisdictions, possibly at lowered 
costs.  If that were the case, then all climate change hopes would depend 
on the adequacy of federal legislation or binding international treaty 
commitments.  Preservation of state and local authority is a more 
prudent alternative. 
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